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Before: MANSMANN, RENDELL and ALDISERT, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed December 5, 2001) 
 
 
  
       Vincent A. Coppola, Esquire 
       Pribanic & Pribanic 
       513 Court Place 
       First Floor 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
       Victor H. Pribanic, Esquire 
       Pribanic & Pribanic 
       1735 Lincoln Way 
       White Oak, PA 15131 
 
        Counsel for Appellee 
 
       D. Michael Fisher 
        Attorney General 
       John G. Knorr, III 
        Chief Deputy Attorney General 
        Chief, Appellate Litigation Section 
       Kemal A. Mericli 
        Senior Deputy Attorney General 
       Office of Attorney General 
        of Pennsylvania 
       Department of Justice 
       Strawberry Square 
       15th Floor 
       Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 
        Counsel for Appellant 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this Section 1983 civil rights action alleging use of 
excessive force by a police officer in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, state trooper Francis J. Murphy, III, appeals 
from the District Court's denial of his motion for summary 
judgment based on qualified immunity. In its recent 
decision in Saucier v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S.Ct. 2151 
(2001), the Supreme Court articulated a new framework for 
analyzing qualified immunity claims which is applicable 
here: the question of whether an officer is entitled to 
qualified immunity is distinct from whether he used 
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unreasonable force. Because the District Court did not have 
the benefit of this framework when it considered Murphy's 
entitlement to qualified immunity, we will vacate the order 
of the District Court and remand this matter for 
reconsideration in accordance with the principles 
announced in Saucier. 
 
I. 
 
This case originated in a 1994 prolonged armed standoff 
between David Bennett and police officers in a field near an 
apartment complex in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. What 
began as a domestic dispute culminated in Bennett's being 
fatally shot by Trooper Murphy. Sally Bennett, David 
Bennett's mother and the administratrix of his estate, filed 
this action alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983.1 The 
matter went to trial in September 1996 and the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Murphy. One year later, 
Bennett filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 60, alleging that information in Murphy's personnel 
records relevant to his credibility had been withheld from 
Bennet during discovery. Because it was "satisfied that 
Bennett was prejudiced by being denied the opportunity to 
consider her use of this important information," the District 
Court found that Bennett was entitled to a new trial. 
Bennett v. Murphy, No. 94-cv-00214, mem. order at 14 
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2000). In granting Bennett's motion, the 
District Court rejected Murphy's argument that a new trial 
was precluded by Murphy's entitlement to qualified 
immunity: "We must recognize . . . that the factfinding 
process in a case of deadly force is usually more 
complicated than that of an alleged search or seizure. We 
find that the facts from which we would make such a ruling 
must first be determined by a jury." Id. at 6. 
 
Prior to the trial, Murphy filed a motion for 
reconsideration and sought summary judgment based on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Originally Bennett, on behalf of herself and her son's estate, made 
numerous state and federal law claims against Murphy and Corporal 
Mark Nowakowski of the Pennsylvania State Police. All claims except 
those of the estate against Murphy alleging violation of Section 1983 
were ultimately dropped or dismissed. 
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his assertion of qualified immunity. The District Court 
denied these motions. Noting that it had "informally and 
unfavorably addressed" Murphy's entitlement to qualified 
immunity in its January 7th order granting Bennett's 
motion for a new trial, the District Court addressed the 
issue of qualified immunity at length. Bennett v. Murphy, 
127 F. Supp.2d 689, 690 (W.D. Pa. 2001). Concluding 
again that Murphy was not entitled to qualified immunity, 
the District Court recounted the facts surrounding the 
shooting in the light most favorable to Bennett. 2 The Court 
then asked whether, given those facts, it was "indisputably 
reasonable as a matter of law" for Murphy to have used 
deadly force against Bennett. Id. at 690. The District Court 
was unable to answer this question in the affirmative and 
concluded that the determination was best left to the jury: 
"[T]here is no clearly defined standard of reasonableness for 
the court to apply and . . . such a standard should emerge 
from the conscience of the community, not the mind of a 
single judge." Id. at 699. The District Court took the 
position that, as a general rule, qualified immunity is 
unavailable in cases involving allegations of excessive force: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court, "ignoring evidentiary disputes," summarized the 
facts as follows: 
 
       The state police were called to the courtyard of a group of 
apartment 
       buildings on the evening of January 4, 1994 to confront a man, 
       David Bennett, who they soon learned was distraught at being 
       unable to see his girlfriend. He was armed with a single shot 
       shotgun that he held vertically in front of him, with the barrel 
       pointed up at his head, and the stock facing down. He was "very 
       deliberate in holding [the gun] toward himself or in the air," and 
did 
       not point the gun at anyone, including state troopers. . . . He 
stated 
       that he wanted to kill himself. . . . As the troopers took up 
positions 
       surrounding him in the open area between the apartment buildings, 
       he became agitated and began moving toward a group of them, but 
       stopped for perhaps four seconds before he was shot.. . . Murphy 
       was positioned 80 yards behind Bennett when he fired. Almost an 
       hour passed between the time the state troopers first arrived on 
the 
       scene, and the time Bennet was shot. 
 
        Bennett admittedly was angry and defiant in the face of a group 
       of determined, armed state troopers. 
 
Id. at 690-691. (Citations to the record omitted.) 
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       [E]xcessive force cases are typically riven with factual 
       disputes about key events. Even where they are not, 
       the decisive question is one of the reasonableness of 
       the officer's conduct in light of all the circumstances. 
       . . . [T]his is a quintessential jury question. 
 
Id. at 694. The District Court concluded that the availability 
of qualified immunity turned on Murphy's credibility: 
 
       [I]t is only from the mind and mouth of Murphy that 
       we can supply the crucial "facts and circumstances 
       confronting" our hypothetical, objectively reasonable 
       officer. It is only from the testimony of Murphy that we 
       can gather the information which he maintains creates 
       the justification for the use of deadly force -- i.e., the 
       belief that existed in his own mind that his fellow 
       officers were in imminent danger of death or serious 
       bodily injury at the hands of Bennett. 
 
Id. at 692. Because this credibility determination could be 
made only by a jury, the District Court reasoned that 
Murphy was not entitled to summary judgment on the 
basis of qualified immunity. Murphy's motion was denied 
and this timely appeal followed. 
 
Because this appeal involves solely a question of law and 
does not turn on disputed issues of fact, we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291.3 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 
(1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
 
II. 
 
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Saucier v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991, 121 
S.Ct. 2151 (2001), clarifying the analysis to be undertaken 
by district courts and courts of appeals considering claims 
of qualified immunity in cases alleging excessive use of force.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court did not identify facts in dispute, nor does this 
appeal require that we evaluate the facts. Murphy's contention on appeal 
is that even if all controverted facts are resolved in favor of Bennett, 
his 
actions were objectively legally reasonable. 
 
4. The decision in Saucier addressed the qualified immunity defense in 
the Bivens context. The analytical framework outlined in Saucier is, 
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In Saucier, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit erred when it adopted an approach to 
qualified immunity which was very similar to the one taken 
by the District Court in this case: "[T]he ruling on qualified 
immunity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion 
with the question whether unreasonable force was used 
. . . ." 121 S. Ct. at 2153. Unless the qualified immunity 
inquiry is undertaken separately from the constitutional 
inquiry, it will "become superfluous or duplicative when 
excessive force is alleged." Id. at 2155. 
 
The Supreme Court stressed that the qualified immunity 
question must be resolved "at the earliest possible stage in 
the litigation." Id. at 2156 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 
U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). "Qualified immunity is 
`an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens 
of litigation.' " Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 
526 (1985). "The privilege is `an immunity from suit rather 
than a mere defense to liability, and like an absolute 
immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial.' " Id. 
 
After Saucier it is clear that claims of qualified immunity 
are to be evaluated using a two-step process. First, the 
court must determine whether the facts, taken in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, show a constitutional 
violation. If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional 
violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the 
officer is entitled to immunity. In this case it is clear that 
Bennett's submissions, viewed in the light most favorable to 
her, do make out a constitutional violation. In Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that 
the use of force contravenes the Fourth Amendment if it is 
excessive under objective standards of reasonableness. If, 
as the plaintiff 's evidence suggested, David Bennett had 
stopped advancing and did not pose a threat to anyone but 
himself, the force used against him, i.e. deadly force, was 
objectively excessive. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
however, applicable to cases under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and to those 
brought pursuant to Section 1983. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 
(1999). 
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Once it is determined that evidence of a constitutional 
violation has been adduced, courts evaluating a qualified 
immunity claim move to the second step of the analysis to 
determine whether the constitutional right was clearly 
established. That is, in the factual scenario established by 
the plaintiff, would a reasonable officer have understood 
that his actions were prohibited? The focus in this step is 
solely upon the law. If it would not have been clear to a 
reasonable officer what the law required under the facts 
alleged, he is entitled to qualified immunity. If the 
requirements of the law would have been clear, the officer 
must stand trial. 
 
Saucier's holding regarding the availability of qualified 
immunity at the summary judgment stage does not mean 
that an officer is precluded from arguing that he reasonably 
perceived the facts to be different from those alleged by the 
plaintiff. An officer may still contend that he reasonably, 
but mistakenly, believed that his use of force was justified 
by the circumstances as he perceived them; this 
contention, however, must be considered at trial. As the 
District Court noted: 
 
       [E]ven where the officer must stand trial, he still 
       benefits from the favorable law precluding 
       consideration of intent or motive, use of hindsight in 
       judging tense, unpredictable situations, and allowances 
       for mistaken judgments. . . . 
 
Bennett, 127 F. Supp. at 694. 
 
III. 
 
The decision in Saucier clarified what was not apparent 
before -- that the immunity analysis is distinct from the 
merits of the excessive force claim. We have concluded that 
the first prong of the two-step Saucier test is satisfied. 
Given the District Court's thorough familiarity with all of 
the aspects of this matter, it is appropriate that it be given 
the first opportunity to apply the second part of the Saucier 
analysis. We will, therefore, vacate the order of the District 
Court and remand this matter for further consideration. 
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